This is the accepted version of the paper.
1 Notably, in June 2010 the United Kingdom announced that it would abolish the previously unified and specialized Financial Services Authority (FSA) and reassign its functions to a body based at the central Bank of England. Considering that the FSA was held up as an exemplar of "best practice" just a few years before, the reform is a dramatic change. This is not the first time we have reconsidered and reformed de jure supervisory governance. Over just the two decades before the recent financial crisis there have been at least two major shifts in ideas and policy choices about who should supervise the banking and securities industries.
2 The first was a mixed style where tions makes these policies more likely to be adopted. Their promotion may have been particularly successful because they benefited from the cachet of being associated with Anglo-American financial regulatory regimes (see Walter, 2008) and by tapping into the "independent governance" paradigm that had dominated beliefs about optimal monetary policy governance since the 1980s (see McNamara, 2002) . The result of this process at the aggregate level is that we observe policy convergence trends.
Simply observing that a specific policy idea was promoted and that it was followed by an increase in the proportion of countries with that policy is an important part of arguing that the idea caused the convergence.
This is the time-order criteria. However, just noticing that the time-order criteria has been met is a very unsatisfying way of making a causal argument. 4 Yee (1996) insists that we study the mechanisms linking ideas to policy choices as well as looking for whether or not the time-order criteria has been met. So, to evaluate whether ideas influenced convergence trends I will use the following criteria as my minimum benchmark:
the observed relationship between possible ideational diffusion mechanisms and a given policy choice must substantially increase soon after a positive idea about the policy begins to be promoted and vice versa for negative ideas.
If the relationships remain largely constant over time then we cannot argue that the promotion of the idea caused policymakers' choices. For shorthand I will refer to this as the time-varying criteria. Please note, I
am not arguing that meeting this time-varying criteria guarantees that an idea caused policy convergence.
It is simply a minimum standard that a causal claim would have to meet.
To empirically test this we need a method that can robustly incorporate time. So, I draw on the growing policy diffusion literature (see Boehmke, 2009 , Brooks, 2005 , Elkins and Simmons, 2005 , Elkins, Guzman and Simmons, 2006 , Füglister, 2011 , Gilardi, 2005 , Gilardi and Füglister, 2008 , Gilardi, Füglister and Luyet, 2009 , Gilardi, 2010 , Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2005 , Lee and Strang, 2006 , Linos, 2011 , Meseguer, 2006 , Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009 , Shipan and Volden, 2008 , Simmons and Elkins, 2004 , Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006 , Strang and Tuma, 1993 , Weyland, 2007 . This body of work has made considerable progress in exploring the causes of cross-country policy convergence. Perhaps remarkably for a political science sub-discipline, it has itself converged on a standard empirical method: Single Transition Event History Analysis (EHA), primarily the Cox Proportional Hazard (PH) model. This model has numerous advantages for examining cross-sectional time-series data (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004) , particularly how a variable's effect changes over time. This quality is necessary for testing the time-varying criteria.
Single Transition EHA nonetheless has difficulty incorporating the many initial conditions and choices that policymakers must consider when changing their financial supervisors. There are many institutional starting points and similarly many new institutions to choose from-the central bank (CB), ministry of finance (MoF), a specialized regulator (SR), or some combination. Given this complexity and guided by data availability I use a pragmatic combination of Cox PH models and Fine and Gray (1999) Competing Risks Event History Analysis (FG-CREHA). This allows me to incorporate both changes over time and multiple starting and ending points. 1 Supervisory Governance Trends
Who Can Supervise?
Systems of financial supervisory governance are often characterized by their position in two dimensions:
(a) the type of bodies that are officially in charge of inspecting financial institutions and (b) their number.
Economists at academic and international institutions have at various times seen both of these as important factors in the functioning of financial regulation. Institutions that are involved in supervision can include the MoF, the CB, 5 or a public body that is specialized to focus only on financial supervision. Supervision can be unified in one of these institutions or shared between a number of them. For example, the United States has numerous specialist supervisors, including the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, among others. The Federal Reserve-the CB-also has supervisory powers. The United Kingdom created a single specialist supervisor in 1997. 6 Please see Table 4 in the Appendix for a full list of countries in the sample. 7 In Figure 1 we can see two governance adoption trends. Each is preceded in time by the promotion of international financial supervisory governance best practice ideas; the SEC and FSA models.
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[ Figure 1 About Here]
1.2.1 The SEC Model Trend (1990 Trend ( to 1996 In the period before 1990 some combination of CB-only and CB/MoF 9 supervision was clearly the dominant mode of supervision. From just after 1990 this began to change. CB/MoF supervision decreased in relative prevalence. At first, much of the shift was to systems with some combination of the CB and a SR that usually focused on securities supervision: the SEC model. By 1996 just under 40 percent of countries in the sample had SEC-like regulators, almost overtaking CB/MoF supervision. Notably, unified supervision by a specialized regulator (the FSA model) was almost non-existent.
The SEC reform trend is further indicated by the changing prevalence of official English-language names given to securities regulators. 10 Figure 2 shows the naming patterns. [ Figure 2 About Here] Model Trend (1997 until at least 2007 In Figure 2 we can see that shortly after 1997 adoption of SEC-like supervision flattened. From that point unified and specialized supervision-the FSA model-began to take off. This is mirrored in the names given to regulators (see Figure 2 ). Before 1997 almost no country had a securities supervisor with a name This adoption trend was closely preceded by heavy promotion of the FSA model as best practice. From 1997 the IMF, the Basel Committee, members of the United Kingdom's government, elite academia, and the business press promoted the FSA model. 13 The United Kingdom, a prominent global financial center, began this trend by creating the FSA in 1997 (Masciandaro, Panisini and Quintyn, 2011, 4) . UK policymakers such as Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown actively promoted it as part of new international best practice standards from 1997 (Walter, 2008, 23-24) . Around this time, many authors in academia and at the IMF began researching and/or promoting some sort of supervisory unification and "independence". A seminal paper on the topic was published by Goodhart and Schoenmaker in 1997. It was followed by many other works (for examples see Goodhart, 2002 , Quintyn, Ramirez and Taylor, 2007 , Masciandaro, 2006 , Masciandaro, Quintyn and Taylor, 2008 . Usually 'independence' meant a regulator separate from elected officials, private interests, and even the CB (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1997, Quintyn and Taylor, 2003 To make a sturdier causal case, in this section I lay out theoretical arguments for how these particular best practice ideas could have caused observed convergence trends. I focus on possible causal mechanisms that can be empirically tested against the time-varying criteria with event history analysis. I also discuss major competing non-ideational and non-diffusion hypotheses.
Policy Convergence Through Ideational Diffusion
I first lay out the general theoretical case for why the SEC and FSA models may have been important causes of the convergence trends we saw in the previous section. I want to establish a number of empirically testable hypotheses about the mechanisms through which these ideas could be important. Nonetheless promotion of best practice ideas could have helped actors believe they were overcoming this uncertainty. Best practice ideas may work as frames Kahneman, 1981, 1986) ' (2001, 393) . Both the SEC and FSA ideas were relatively easy for policymakers to accept, because they explicitly tied into the broader and already widely accepted "independence" policy paradigm (see Hall, 1993) Quintyn, Ramirez and Taylor, 2007 , for an explicit discussion of this connection).
Ideas as Causal Models
Another reason that the ideas may have been accepted more easily by policymakers is that, being based on regulatory systems in the United States and the United Kingdom they likely gained the 'prestige and cachet' that was afforded to the Anglo-American financial regulatory model by the international community of financial policymakers, academics, and private sector actors, especially in the late 1990s (see Walter, 2008) .
Mechanisms
Level of Promotion Despite their use of the same independence paradigm and association with prestigious Anglo-American institutions, the previous section demonstrated that there was significantly less active support for the SEC model even at its peak in the early 1990s. It appears to have been largely promoted only by IOSCO. Conversely, the FSA model was very highly promoted by many international organizations and policymakers in countries with prominent financial markets. Using Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) terminology, the SEC idea was promoted from a much smaller "organizational platform".
19 If an idea's level of promotion is important for its adoption, we should observe a weaker diffusion effect for the SEC model compared to the FSA model. This leads to the first hypothesis that the following ideational diffusion mechanisms should have a stronger effect for adoption of specialized and unified supervision than CB and specialized supervision.
Peers & Ideational Promotion A number of theories have been put forward for why policies spread within a region or between peer groups conceptualized more broadly (see Brooks, 2005, 280-281) . 20 Formal peer groups can be organizational platforms that actively promote or discourage certain best practice ideas.
Furthermore, counties may be learning from the experiences of peers who have adopted a given policy. Peers' adoption of a best practice idea may allow policymakers to examine claims that a supervisory governance means is at least associated with a policy end in countries with relatively similar conditions (see Meseguer, 2005 , Simmons and Elkins, 2004 , Volden, Ting and Carpenter, 2008 . The more peers that adopt a supervisory model, the more opportunity there is to learn about a promoted policy. Despite the abundance of other peer hypotheses, We can use the time-varying criteria to determine if peer effects could be an ideational diffusion mechanism. Their effects should change when an idea is promoted.
The peer ideational diffusion hypothesis proposes that a jurisdiction is more likely to adopt a supervisory model as a larger proportion of their peers adopt it and it is promoted. The probability of creating an SEC or FSA-like supervisor increases as the proportion of peers who adopt these institutions increases and following the models' promotion.
If the proportion of peer adopters is estimated to have an effect, but does not change when the model is promoted we have evidence for other types of peer diffusion processes. Effects that remain the same could indicate emulation, competition or some other process (see Simmons and Elkins, 2004) .
Crisis Diffusion As mentioned earlier, a number of authors (Blyth, 2002 , McNamara, 1998 , Windmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007 argue that ideas help actors overcome means-ends uncertainty and ultimately shape their policy choices. Being in a crisis heightens uncertainty and may make heavily promoted ideas more attractive. During a crisis it can be very difficult to determine how much the supervisory structure contributed to the crisis and how it should be changed. This is where prominent best practice ideas may come in. They help actors interpret what is wrong and suggest solutions to the problem. Walter (2008, Ch. 1) argues that best practice independent supervision was specifically promoted as a way of understanding the 1997 Asian financial crisis-i.e. as a crisis caused by overly close relationships between regulators and financial institutions-and suggested a solution-de jure regulatory independence. This leads to the hypothesis that jurisdictions in crisis are likely to adopt a supervisory model when it is heavily promoted.
Non-Ideational Convergence
Functional Response to Crisis In their study of capital account liberalization Simmons and Elkins (2004) propose that crisis is not a diffusion mechanism, but has an economically functional effect on policymakers' decisions to open (or close) capital markets. They hypothesize, that countries with similar experiences with economic shocks will choose the same policy solution: curbing capital outflows. They propose that having a crisis should hinder the adoption of the heavily promoted capital openness policy (though they find evidence that the opposite is true). Likewise countries may adopt certain supervisory styles in crises because the styles optimally solve their problems. As noted before, there is some reason to be doubtful that one type of supervisory governance is actually optimal in crises, or at least that policymakers objectively know what type this is. Masciandaro, Panisini and Quintyn (2011) found little empirical evidence that FSA-type regulators are actually negatively correlated with banking sector resilience after crisis, despite it being promoted as a more robust style of supervision. Nonetheless, whether or not policymakers respond to crisis with supervisory reforms in a functional or ideational manner is an empirical issue which I examine with the time-varying criteria below. If actors adopt supervisory reforms in response to crises in a functional manner we would expect the effect of crises on reforms to be constant over time.
Financial Industry Cross-sector Consolidation One of the primary functional, i.e. non-ideational arguments for unified supervision was that as financial companies expanded across, sectors supervisors should or are likely to do the same (Čihák and Podpiera, 2007 , Lastra, 2003 , Masciandaro, 2006 . 21 Returning to the example of the Taiwanese Financial Supervisory Commission, they also highlight financial market consolidation as a reason for creation. Holding aside the endogeneity issue of whether or not the trend towards consolidation was also the product of ideational diffusion-i.e. the idea that successful financial institutions needed to diversify across sectors leading to regulatory changes-supervisory consolidation may be a functional response to changing economic circumstances. This leads to the hypothesis that jurisdictions with more consolidated financial sectors are more likely to adopt unified supervision.
3 Hypotheses Testing Figure 3 shows the number and type of reforms observed in the sample. We can see, for example, that there were nine instances of supervision being taken away from the CB/MoF and replaced with a unified and specialized regulator, the FSA model. In total 19 FSA-type regulators were created. SEC-type regulators were created 18 times. Every one of these regulatory systems was made by replacing the MoF with a specialized regulator along side the central bank.
Empirical Models
When choosing an empirical model we need to keep in mind the total number of reforms we actually observe. because it takes the history of the units of analysis into consideration, primarily through the hazard rate:
h(t). The hazard rate is the rate of an event happening to a unit, such as adopting a certain form of financial supervisor governance, over a very small change in time conditional on the units' covariates. Formally,
I estimate covariate effects on the hazard rate of transitions between multiple SRs and a unified SR (the FSA model) using a Cox PH model (see also Jones, 2004, Golub, 2008) . The basic Cox proportional hazard rate for the ith unit at time t is given by,
h 0 (t) is the baseline hazard at time t, i.e. the hazard rate when all of the covariates x are 0.
Removing the MoF and Possibly the CB from Supervision
Single Transition EHA is confined to questions regarding dichotomous event types, e.g. whether or not a country liberalizes its pension system (Brooks, 2005) or a country dyad creates a bilateral investment treaty (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons, 2006) . Given that there are relatively many observations on the three transitions away from CB/MoF controlled supervision, we are able to use competing risks event history analysis to examine the reasons that policymakers choose one type of reform over the others. There is no reason to assume that all of the variables will only effect the probability of making one type of reform and not the others. So, the most appropriate way to examine the covariate effects with competing risks analysis is with hazards of the sub-distribution (Bakoyannis and Touloumi, 2011, Pintilie, 2007) . The hazard of the sub-distribution 23 for transition k at time t (γ k (t)) is given by,
where T is the time of the observed transition C.
Fine and Gray (1999) developed a Cox PH analogue to empirically model the effect of covariates on the hazard of the sub-distribution given by,
γ k,0 (t) is the baseline sub-hazard analogous to h 0 (t) from a standard Cox PH model. FG-CREHA allows us to assess the impact of covariates on choices to reform CB/MoF supervision, given that they have multiple reforms to choose from and variables may have an influence on more than one reform choice. See (Gandrud, forthcoming) for a further discussion of how and when to use FG-CREHA in policy diffusion research.
I do not consider reforms of SEC and FSA supervisors since they were reformed very infrequently.
Testing the Time-Varying Criteria
All of the ideational diffusion hypotheses predict that the effect of a potential diffusion mechanism will change from the time when a new idea is promoted. To examine whether or not the effects do change we can leverage a basic assumption of Cox PH and FG-CREHA: the proportional hazards assumption (PHA).
This is the assumption that the hazards/sub-hazards for all units "differ only by a factor of proportionality" (Chung, Schmidt and Witte, 1991, 71) . Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn argue that proportional hazards "means that the effects of covariates are constant over time" (2001, 973 This would not be a valid conclusion. The PHA diagnostics could not test this. In fact the finding could provide evidence for ideational diffusion hypotheses that predict an interaction between FSA idea promotion and diffusion mechanisms. If we observe no effect followed by a relationship between a given variable and FSA reforms after 1997 then we could say that the relationship between the variable and the reform changed over time: it changed from no relationship to a relationship. If the direction of the relationship is the same as the one predicted by the ideational diffusion mechanism hypotheses we would have found evidence for the predicted interaction according to the time-varying criteria.
To examine this we should focus not just on the traditional tests of the PHA and point estimate tables where coefficients are averaged over the observation period, but also visually examine how the quantities of interest-predicted hazard rates 26 for the Cox PH model and similar cumulative incidence functions 27 for the FG-CREHA models-change over time.
Variables
Crisis I gathered data from Laeven and Valencia (2008) Peers One way to test peer effects is through the proportion of other countries in a geographical region that have adopted the SEC or FSA model, respectively, in the previous year. Unfortunately, though the sample of 83 countries is wide ranging, it is not exhaustive. A regional proportion of adopters variable would therefore not actually capture the true regional proportion, resulting in a biased indicator. Instead variables are based on adopter proportions in select formal and informal peer groups that I have exhaustive data on and where peer effects are plausibly related to supervisory reforms. 29 I did examine an East Asian peer group, 30 which had low levels of formal peer organization, but saw widespread supervisory reforms in my observation period. Formal peer groups included the Basel Committee, the European Union, and the
Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS).
31 The last group, founded in 1992, regularly pushed for financial supervisory reforms from the mid-1990s.
32
I created Monadic row-standardized spatial effects for each group (see Neumayer and Plümper, 2010a,b) .
33
These are equivalent to variables of the proportion of peer adopters in the previous year. I rescaled the variables to be between zero and 100 to ease interpretation. Note it would be naive to assume that the peer diffusion process would work in the same way across this heterogenous set of peer groups. Instead, the purpose of these variables is to identify what types of peer groups may have been important for causing particular reform choices.
Financial Industry Cross-sector Consolidation Firms' cross-sector financial activity is measured using the asset diversity variable from Laeven and Levine (2007) . I also examined other indicators of banking system structure, including deposit bank assets to GDP (Deposit Bank Assets/GDP) and bank concentration (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009 ).
Other Variables A number of other economic and political variables were added to the analyses to examine the possibility that the main results of interest were caused by omitted variable bias. These included GDP/capita in thousands of US dollars (UN, 2009) and CB governor (CBG) tenure in years de Haan, 2008, 2010) . The latter was modified so that the first year of tenure was coded as 0.5. It was coded -1 if there was no CBG. Bureaucratic Quality and other International Country Risk Indicators (2009) were also included as well as various measures of veto players (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003) and democracy as measured by Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) (Pemstein, Meserve and Melton, 2010) . Only results for bureaucratic quality are included because the others were not robust. As the IMF was a promoter of the FSA-model and may have used crisis loans to coerce countries to accept it (see Vreeland, 2003) , IMF stand-by agreements from Dreher (2006 Dreher ( , updated to 2008 were also used. It was a dummy variable equalling one the year an agreement was signed and the following year, zero otherwise.
Please refer to the Appendix for descriptive statistics. [ Tables 1, 2 , and 3 About Here]
EHA Results
Removing the MoF and Replacing it with SEC-like Supervision
Tests of the proportional hazards assumption indicate that the Basel Committee and East Asia spatial effects, as well as the IMF stand-by agreement variable had time-varying effects on decisions to create financial supervision involving the central bank and a specialized regulator-the SEC model. Linear time-varying coefficients (see Stata Corp., 2009, 214-215) 39 were added to more accurately estimate the time-varying effects (see Table 1 ). I created graphs of the time-varying sub-hazard ratios over time to determine the direction of the change (not shown, but they can be created with Stata code provided in the replication file).
The time-varying coefficients for both spatial effect variables fall over time. Around 1990 they both have a positive effect on removing the MoF from combined CB/MoF supervision and replacing it with a SR.
40
But these effects fall and become negative by the mid-1990s. For East Asia this is equivalent to saying The crisis dummy had no effect. Because of its low level of promotion, perhaps most policymakers did not consider the SEC model to be a plausible way of calming a crisis.
The main finding in this analysis has been a lack of evidence for time-constant relationships. Instead we found evidence that peer spatial effects varied, when we expect that they would given an interaction with highly promoted ideas. Overall, most of the possible ideational diffusion mechanisms were negatively associated with SEC adoption. This finding generally conforms to the promotion hypothesis. The SEC model received little promotion by international organizations and prominent countries. So, we would expect ideational diffusion mechanisms to have a weak impact on adoption. Some unobserved factors likely led to SEC model convergence.
[ Figure 4 About Here]
Unification of Multiple Specialist Supervisors: the FSA Model 1
I did not find any violations of the proportional hazards assumption in either of the models looking at why countries created unified specialized regulators. As mentioned in the previous section, I expected this because few countries created this type of regulatory governance before 1997. Such a finding is evidence for ideational promotion theories, if the direction of the relationship between the mechanisms and reforms is also what we predict.
As the crisis diffusion hypothesis predicted, crisis(log) has a positive effect on multiple supervisors being unified after 1997. Note that the coefficient is negative, but this indicates a positive effect due to the variable's scale. Please see the earlier discussion of the variable's operationalization for details. The crisis variable meets the time-varying criteria. We can see in Figure 4 that crisis has no effect before 1997, but then becomes positive after the FSA model is promoted in 1997. This is contrary to the functional crisis response hypothesis. Asset diversity does not appear to have an effect on decisions to unify multiple supervisors. Admittedly, it is poorly operationalized so these results should certainly not be treated as conclusive. The prevalence of the FSA model among the CBSS, EU, or Basel Committee also does not appear to have affected unification choices for countries that had multiple specialized supervisors, especially when we control for bureaucratic quality and deposit bank assets as a proportion of GDP.
[ Figure 5 About Here]
Unifying CB/MoF Supervision into a SR: the FSA Model 2
Again, as the promotion and crisis diffusion hypotheses predicted, having a banking crisis increased the likelihood of creating an FSA-like regulator if previous supervision had been done by the CB/MoF and the model was being promoted (see Table 3 ). We can see this in Figure 5 . For countries in crises the probability of adopting the FSA model is large and increases, but only after 1997 when the idea began to be heavily promoted. This fits the time-varying criteria. The IMF stand-by agreement variable was significant in a model that did not include crisis. However, it dropped out of significance when crises were included. This suggests that it is the means-ends uncertainty created by crises that may be a mechanism of FSA model diffusion, rather than IMF coercion.
The CBSS spatial effect is positive and very strong from 1997, when the CBSS promoted the FSA model; also meeting the time-varying criteria. The predicted effect shown in Figure 5 seems comically strong.
However, it is largely depicting empirical reality. Only two-Denmark and Sweden-out of ten CBSS countries had a unified SR before 1997. After 1997 only two CBSS countries-Lithuania and Poland-did not have one.
These two had adopted SEC-type supervision in the early 1990s and were therefore not included in this analysis of reforms made to CB/MoF systems from then on. The reason that the model predicts that all CBSS members with CB/MoF supervision would choose FSA reforms is that all six of them actually did. and 2002, the period we have consolidation data for. Hopefully, more complete data will become available in the future so that we can more adequately examine the role of cross-sector consolidation.
Conclusion: Did Ideas Influence Financial Supervisory Convergence?
In this paper I have shown how the time-varying criteria can be used as a minimum benchmark for assessing whether or not ideational diffusion affected de jure financial supervisory governance convergence trends. I have also extended the diffusion literature's methodological toolkit by demonstrating how a pragmatic use of multiple types of event history analysis can be used to examine policymaking in complex choice environments.
What has this approach enabled us to learned about financial supervisory governance convergence and what has it contributed to the broader political economy literature? I found evidence that the level of promotion is important for whether or not an idea is diffused. The little promoted SEC model does not seem to have been diffused through ideational mechanisms, such as crisis diffusion or the peer groups identified here. Some unobserved factors led to early 1990s convergence on SEC-type supervision.
The story for the heavily promoted FSA model is very different. This paper has identified a number of possible ideational mechanisms behind convergence on the FSA model. Banking crises, times of particular means-ends uncertainty, appear to not have had a uniform effect on FSA reforms over time, even when controlling for a number of financial sector structure factors. According to the time-varying criteria, this finding is evidence against a purely functional approach to understanding the impact of crisis. Crises are associated with reforms in the direction of the strongly promoted FSA idea at the same time that the model was promoted. Crises appeared to have had no effect on the much less promoted SEC idea. From this evidence, it seems that in banking crises actors may be more likely to adopt highly promoted best practice ideas. Certain financial supervisory recommendations may actually be functionally optimal. But even if this was true, and the evidence so far is mixed, clearly all policymakers do not know this at all times. I also find some evidence for the peer diffusion effect, specifically in formal groups, especially in the CBSS which actively promoted the FSA idea. More research is needed to understand why the CBSS was much more successful than the Basel Committee at promoting the FSA model.
Though I found evidence that some ideational diffusion mechanisms met the minimal time-varying criteria, due to limited data I was only partially able to examine functional banking system structure causes of supervisory governance reforms-in particular cross-sector financial industry consolidation. Most transitions to the FSA model were during the period when data was available and results from models with just this period were largely the same as the entire time span, i.e. no effect. Nonetheless, from the evidence presented here we can not draw any definitive conclusions about whether cross-sector consolidation, consistently discussed in the financial supervision literature as being an important reason for consolidating financial supervision, was or was not the main driver of supervisory governance consolidation in this period.
The pragmatic event history analysis approach I used in this paper to examine the time-varying criteria could easily be adopted to study the reasons, especially ideational promotion, for policy choices in a number of other complex issue areas. Future studies could examine, for example, how ideational diffusion may be important for choices to use fiscal stimulus or austerity to respond to economic downturns or the use of different types of bad banks to resolve banking crises.
Notes
1 Given space constraints, I focus on changes to the de jure actors who supervise and look at the period up until the recent crisis. It is admittedly also important to look at de facto governance, regulatory changes, and the economic outcomes of supervision choices. Hopefully future studies will examine the degree to which my conclusions can be generalized to these areas.
For recent work examining the economic consequences of financial supervisory governance see Levine (2004, 2006) , Eichengreen and Dincer (2011 ), Jordana and Rosas (2011 ), Masciandaro, Panisini and Quintyn (2011 ), Quintyn and Taylor (2003 .
2 Financial supervision broadly encompasses banking, securities, and insurance. However, for simplicity, this paper focuses on banking and securities both in its discussion and empirical analysis.
3 My use of the term 'SEC model' refers not only to the securities regulator, but also the fact that some other body is regulating the deposit banking industry. It describes supervision in both sectors.
4 See Blyth (1997, 236) and Yee (1996) for further details of this critique.
5 The distinction between MoF and CB supervision may be superficial if the CB is not independent. However I focus on de jure supervision, because of the difficulty of measuring actual supervisory independence for the wide range of countries in my sample. A number of measures have been used for monetary policy independence (famously, Cukierman, Web and Neyapti, 1992) , but equivalent measures are not widely available for financial supervision.
6 Information was not widely available on supervisors earlier than this period. Data was gathered by the author using a variety of sources detailed in a data appendix available upon request. The author is indebted to Quintyn et al.'s (2007) work.
In many ways the current sample is an expansion of their sample. An 'Other' category, that included up to six jurisdictions was collapsed into the CB/MoF category.
7 The list of sources consulted in the creation of this data set can be found at: http://bit.ly/Qz7KHt.
8 It is important to understand the processes behind the creation of these ideas and the reasons that they were promoted. I touch on some of these issues in this paper. However an in depth study of these issues is beyond the scope of the paper. For
an example of what this research might look like please see please see Chwieroth (2010) for an examination of how ideas have developed in and come to be promoted by IMF staff.
9 Due to a limited number of CB only countries and the difficulty of separating CBs from MoFs when the CB is not clearly independent, these two categories are combined throughout the paper.
10 Focusing on official English names clearly ignores non-English name convergence. Spanish speaking countries, for example rarely give official English names to their financial supervisors (or have English language version websites). This would certainly be an interesting area of further study.
11 Coding done by the author.
12 Much of the literature and documents from government and international organizations on financial supervision uses the term "independence" (see Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1997, Masciandaro, Quintyn and Taylor, 2008) . This can be a confusing term since the authors are often referring to making the supervisor independent of a possibly already independent CB. To avoid confusion, I use the term "specialized" instead. See below for a further discussion.
13 Despite the previous moderate SEC model adoption trend, it was so minor that Quintyn, Ramirez and Taylor could argue in 2007 that the attention given to supervisory governance over the past decade was new:
The discussion about independence, accountability, and more broadly, governance of financial sector regulatory and supervisory agencies. . . is still relatively new. . . Previously, the organizational structure of supervision had been widely viewed as a relatively unimportant issue, both in theory and in practice, but this perception changed dramatically about a decade ago. (2007, 3) 14 Note, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1997) discussed both the potential positive and negative consequences of specialized supervision. However, this piece is often quoted in later research as advocating unified SR.
15 From an interview conducted by the author in Beijing with Zhixiang Zhang on 11 March 2010.
16 The recommendations' timing furthermore closely corresponded to the increasing de jure prevalence of central bank and regulatory independence in other areas (see McNamara, 2002, Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2005) .
17 Goodhart and Schoenmaker actually discussed considerable skepticism about the term independence's appropriateness for financial regulation. However, in many later works, particularly by IMF staff writers, their 1997 piece is referenced as being a founding document of the supervisory independence idea (for example Quintyn, Ramirez and Taylor, 2007) .
dichotomously code 'the religion' of a society that is almost evenly split between Christians and Muslims, for example), but exploratory descriptive analysis also indicates that these would not be strong predictors.
21 Initially the regulatory capture literature (Stigler, 1971 ) seems a natural place to look for theories concerning financial supervision. Private sector capture was certainly a concern of those proposing supervisory separation from political actors (see Quintyn and Taylor, 2003) . However, this doesn't appear to be likely to explain governance reform choices. If regulatory policy was already captured by the financial sector, why would they lobby to have it changed? Financial sector structure variables are included in the models partially to account for potential changes in the power of the sector which might lead them to have more or less influence over governance choices.
22 Please note that International Country Risk Indicators are made available for replication only. They should not be distributed.
23 Covariates are omitted for simplicity. 24 We can use a number of PHA diagnostic tests such as residual-based approaches Zorn, 2001, Fine and Gray, 1999) and time interactions (Stata Corp., 2009, 214-215) . 33 The procedure I used to create the dyadic data sets for finding the spacial effects was from Gilardi and Füglister (2008) .
34 Asset diversity for firms with assets of at least US$100 million is calculated by 1 − (Net loans−Other earning assets) Total earning assets .
35 Pakistan and Venezuela, included in Laeven and Levine (2007) were not included in the analysis due to unavailable data on their financial supervisors.
36 Results from models with very highly correlated and insignificant variables are not show. These are discussed in the table captions.
37 i.e. statistically significant at at least the 5% level in Amelia II, including comparing observed and imputed variable densities and running models with overdispersed starting values. These methods did not reveal any major anomalies in the imputed data used for this paper's analyses. 39 The estimated linear time-varying coefficients are made up of two parts, a non-time-varying β and a time-varying β(t). So the coefficient is β + β(t).
Various non-linear functions of time were also tried, but did not substantively change the results.
40 The GDP per capita variable was also negative and significant at between the 5 and 10% significance level depending on the model specification.
41 From a discussion with Charles Goodhart conducted 5 October 2010. The graph shows the supervisory governance reforms observed in the data set. For example, there were nine observed instances of a CB/MoF supervisory system being changed to a unified and specialized regulator (the FSA Model).
Note: zeros indicate that no reforms of that type were observed. Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** at 10/5/1% significance levels. All models were compared to similar models over the time period 1997 -2007 to determine if the asset diversity variable produced different results. Diagnostic tests using SchoenfieldType residuals (see Fine and Gray, 1999) and time interactions were used to test the proportional hazards assumption. Linear time-varying covariates were added when the assumption was violated (Stata Corp., 2009, 214-215) . Bureaucratic Quality and Democracy (UDS) were excluded due to high insignificance and high correlation with GDP/Capita. Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** at 10/5/1% significance levels. A number of other model specifications were tested that included variables such as the number of veto players (see Keefer and Stasavage, 2003) suggested by Gilardi and Füglister (2008) . Democracy (UDS) and GDP/Captia were excluded because they were highly correlated with Bureaucratic Quality (0.413 and 0.734, respectively) and had very unstable coefficients. Bureaucratic Quality was kept in this analysis because it produced the strongest and most stable results. The spatial effect for East Asia was not included because none of the East Asian countries were in the risk set apart from China in [2005] [2006] . Results for models with the Crisis Dummy are not shown because when included the maximum likelihood estimation failed to converge. Stata's estat phtest was used to test the proportional hazard's assumption. Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** at 10/5/1% significance levels. All models were compared to similar models over the time period 1997 -2007 to determine if the asset diversity variable produced different results. Diagnostic tests using Schoenfield-Type residuals (see Fine and Gray, 1999) and time interactions (Stata Corp., 2009, 214-215) were used to test the proportional hazards assumption. Bureaucratic Quality and Democracy (UDS) were excluded due to high insignificance and high correlation with GDP/Capita. 
